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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
STUART FOSTER HOUGHTON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010020-CA 
Priority No. 2 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgement of conviction1 for Criminal Nonsupport of a 
Child, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1999), in the 
Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, 
presiding. 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) 
(e) (Supp. 2001), which grants this Court jurisdiction over appeals from district court 
criminal cases not involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE FIRST ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
First Issue: Did the trial court err in issuing three jury instructions which are incorrect 
1
 A copy of the Minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment," R. 112-13, is 
included in Addendum A. 
statements of the law, argumentative, duplicative, or inconsistent with other instructions? 
Standard of Review: "The standard of review for jury instructions to which counsel has 
objected is correctness." State v. Pearson. 1999 UT App 220, ^ 7, 985 P.2d 919 (quoting 
State v. Brvant. 965 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). 
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 141 [186-88]. 
STATEMENT OF THE SECOND ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Second Issue: Does the conviction fail where the State did not present sufficient 
evidence that Appellant Stuart Houghton ["Mr. Houghton"] did not have just cause in 
failing to provide for the support of his child? 
Standard of Review: "When a jury verdict is challenged on the ground that the evidence 
is insufficient,... '[this court] review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury.1" State 
v. Stringham. 957 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Hamilton. 827 
P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992)). "[0]nly if that evidence is so 'inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he . . . was convicted"' will this Court reverse 
the conviction. State v. Pearson. 1999 UT App 220, ^  8, 985 P.2d 919 (quoting State v. 
Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1322 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). 
Preservation: This issue is preserved at R. 141 [103-04]. 
2 
RELEVANT STATUTE AND RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
1. The following statute is determinative of the issues on appeal: 
Criminal Nonsupport, Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1999). The full text of this 
statute is provided in Addendum B. 
2. The following Rule of Criminal Procedure is relevant on appeal: 
Instructions, Utah R.Crim.Pro. 19 (2001). The full text of this rule is provided in 
Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On 28 March 2000 Mr. Houghton was charged by information with one count of 
Criminal Nonsupport. R. 3-5. He pled not guilty to the charge and was tried before a jury 
on 8 November 2000. R. 141 [3]. Following the State's presentation of its case, the 
defense counsel made a motion to dismiss the case for insufficiency of evidence. R. 141 
[103-04]. The trial court denied the motion. R. 141 [104]. 
Before sending the jury out to deliberate, the trial court prepared jury instructions. 
R. 141 [150-67]. The defense counsel objected to three of the instructions, numbers 7, 10 
and 11, which read as follows: 
7. You are instructed that the offense of Criminal Non-Support is 
committed not only where there is a complete failure to support the child, 
but also where there is a partial failure to provide for the children, so long 
as the support furnished is not adequate under the circumstances. 
R.83. 
3 
10. You are instructed that a parent must make reasonable efforts to find 
ways to provide support for his or her children. 
R.86. 
11. One who fails to diligently seek employment or engages in activity 
causing the loss of employment does not have a lawful excuse to a failure 
to provide charge. 
R.87. 
The defense counsel asserted that these instructions were not statements of the 
law, but commentary upon the evidence. R. 141 [186]. She also indicated that the 
instructions were duplicative because other instructions adequately described the 
elements of the offense. R. 141 [186-87]. The trial court overruled the defense counsel's 
objection, and issued instructions 7, 10, and 11 to the jury. R. 141 [155-56]. 
Mr. Houghton was convicted of the third degree felony of Criminal Nonsupport. 
R. 104. He filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 115-16. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Houghton and Nancy Parks ["Ms. Parks"] were married in 1982, R. 141 [58, 
106], and had one child together, Hillary Rose Houghton ["Hillary"].2 In 1986 Mr. 
Houghton and Ms. Parks divorced and Ms. Parks was awarded custody of Hillary. 
Exhibit Envelope [Decree of Dissolution of Marriage 1-2]. The divorce decree obliged 
Mr. Houghton to pay child support in the amount of $200 per month. R. 141 [59]. 
2
 Ms. Parks was married previously and had one daughter, Emery, from this union. R. 
141 [59-60]. Ms. Parks' first husband died in an automobile accident. R. 141 [60]. 
4 
Throughout his marriage to Ms. Parks, Mr. Houghton had been employed as a 
welder at Snappy Welding Service. He remained there for a year or two after the divorce. 
R. 141 [75-76,107-08]. During that time, he made regular child support payments. R. 
141 [76-77]. Then the shop was sold, and Mr. Houghton's job ended. R. 141 [108]. 
About that time, Mr. Houghton's child support payments became less consistent. R. 141 
[77]. Sometimes he made the payments, sometimes he made only partial payments, and 
sometimes he did not make the payments. R. 141 [77, 114]; Exhibit Envelope [Child 
Computation of Arrears 1987-93], 
After becoming unemployed, Mr. Houghton worked at a variety of part-time and 
temporary jobs. R. 141 [107-14]. He helped install a log processor for Clammoth Lumber 
Company, R. 141 [109], worked as a construction millwright for O & S Contractors, R. 
141 [110-12], helped a man build some corrals, R. 141 [113], and helped another man 
build decks and remodel homes. R. 141 [113]. He "took whatever [he] could find." R. 
141 [113]. He testified, "I've tried to make [child support payments] as much as I could, 
at least partial payments. I have in mind keeping with it but at times I just didn't have 
enough to make the full payment but I tried to pay something." R. 141 [114]. The last 
payment that he made was in June of 1993, when he made a payment of $844.70.3 
3
 A copy of the Child Support Computation of Arrears, calculated from 1987 until 2000, 
is attached in Addendum D. Exhibit Envelope [Child Support Computation of Arrears]. 
Mr. Houghton made regular child support payments until September, 1987. R. 141 [76-
77, 100]; Exhibit Envelope [Child Support Computation of Arrears in 1993]. In 1987 and 1988 
Mr. Houghton's payments to the Office of Recovery Services staggered between $85 and $200 
per month, and a few payments were not made at all. R. 141 [100]; Exhibit Envelope [Child 
5 
By autumn of 1994 Mr. Houghton was having health problems. R. 141 [115]. He 
had a hernia, a neck injury, cataracts, a foot injury, and hemorrhoids. Id. Additionally, he 
was suffering from a palsy which had begun when he was thirteen years old. Id. He had 
experienced tremors in his hands for many years, including the years he was married to 
Ms. Parks,4 but the tremors worsened after he turned forty. R. 141 [116]. By the end of 
1994, he was admitted to a Veterans Administration facility, the White City Domiciliary, 
because of his physical problems and his homelessness.5 He stayed there about eight 
months. R. 141 [117, 129-30]. He received hernia surgery, cataract surgery, anus surgery, 
and dental treatment. R. 141 [117]. Additionally, he was given a prescription, Propanol, 
to treat his tremors. R. 141 [118]. The prescription was not effective. R. 141 [119]. 
Support Computation of Arrears in 1987-88]. In 1989 Mr. Houghton made four payments of 
$200 each. R. 141 [100]; Exhibit Envelope [Child Support Computation of Arrears in 1989]. In 
1990 he made four payments of $200 and one payment of $400. R. 141 [100]; Exhibit Envelope 
[Child Support Computation of Arrears in 1990]. In 1991 he made one payment of $200 and one 
payment of $100. R. 141 [100]; Exhibit Envelope [Child Support Computation of Arrears in 
1991]. In 1992 the Office of Recovery Services received a payment of $995, part of which 
originated from a tax refund, a payment of $200, a payment of $452, a payment of $339, and a 
payment of $396.10. R. 141 [101]; Exhibit Envelope [Child Support Computation of Arrears in 
1992]. In 1993, he made a payment of $125, a payment of $58, a payment of $200, and a 
payment of $844.70. R. 141 [101-02]; Exhibit Envelope [Child Support Computation of Arrears 
in 1993]. 
4
 R. 141 [73]. Although Ms. Parks testified that Mr. Houghton's shaking was "normal to 
people who drink a lot," Id, and that he drank one beer every evening when he arrived home 
from work, R. 141 [74], the shaking does not appear to be related to drinking. Ms. Parks 
indicated that Mr. Houghton would shake more when he was nervous and sometimes he 
wouldn't shake at all. R. 141 [74]. Additionally, Ms. Parks testified that Mr. Houghton had 
experienced hand tremors from the time she first met him when she was fifteen years old. R. 141 
[74, 77]. Mr. Houghton indicated that he had suffered from hand tremors since he was thirteen 
years old. R. 141 [115]. 
5
 R. 141 [116, 130]. Mr. Houghton is a veteran of the Vietnam War, where he served as a 
medic. R. 141 [129-30]. 
6 
While Mr. Houghton was at the Domiciliary, Ms. Parks called and left him a 
message. He returned the call. R. 141 [67]. Ms. Parks and Mr. Houghton discussed the 
arrangement of a visit between Hillary and Mr. Houghton.6 Then Ms. Parks asked Mr. 
Houghton to pay child support. Id The two began arguing. Id. Ms. Parks testified that 
Mr. Houghton called her an obscene name, said that he would not ever send her any 
money, and hung up on her.7 
After Mr. Houghton left the Domiciliary, he went to work at Harris Ranch, which 
was owned by Mr. Houghton's close friend, Earl Harris. R. 141 [133-34]. Mr. Houghton 
roped and branded livestock, repaired equipment, welded, and helped with other assorted 
tasks. R. 141 [120]. In exchange, he received room and board. R. 141 [120, 134]. He 
stayed at Harris Ranch for about a year, and then moved to another ranch to help plant an 
alfalfa crop. R. 141 [121,134]. He was allowed to live in a trailer near the alfalfa field, 
but was not given wages or a salary. R. 141 [121]. 
Mr. Houghton later went to Canada and helped refurbish an abandoned cannery 
town which the owners hoped to turn into a hunting and fishing attraction. R. 141 [121-
22, 135]. Again, he received only room and board for his work. R. 141 [122, 136]. Then 
he worked at Willy Roof Cleaning, where he did odd jobs in exchange for permission to 
6
 R. 141 [69]. Mr. Houghton and Ms. Parks spent their married life in Oregon, and Mr. 
Houghton remained in Oregon thereafter. R. 141 [105-07]. However, Ms. Parks moved to Utah 
in 1988. R. 141 [76]. 
7
 Id. Conversely, Mr. Houghton testified that he told Ms. Parks that he couldn't send any 
money at that time, but that he would send money when he could. R. 141 [126-27]. 
7 
stay in an old trailer that had previously been used for storage. R. 141 [123]. 
Mr. Houghton testified that he applied for various paying jobs, but potential 
employers "would see me shaking and wouldn't want anything to do with me." R. 141 
[125]. Mr. Houghton also applied for disability benefits because of the tremors in his 
hands,8 but his application was denied and he did not appeal. R. 141 [126]. 
Most recently, Mr. Houghton went to work for a Corvette shop. R. 141 [123, 142]. 
The owner allowed Mr. Houghton to clean out "a storage room behind the parts 
department down in the basement," and he stayed there. R. 141 [124]. This arrangement 
improved Mr. Houghton's living conditions because a bathroom and shower were 
available to him. R. 141 [123-24]. Such facilities had not been available at Willy Roof 
Cleaning. Id. As with his previous jobs, however, he did not receive a salary or wages, 
only a place to stay and something to eat. R. 141 [124,144]. 
Since leaving the White City Domiciliary, Mr. Houghton has not paid any child 
support9 and has not had a job which paid him wages or a salary. R. 141 [124]; Exhibit 
Envelope [Child Support Computation of Arrears 1994-2000]. Ms. Parks testified that 
her current husband has supported Hillary and the rest of the family with income from his 
8
 R. 141 [125]. Mr. Houghton applied for the benefits after he was ordered to do so by an 
Oregon court which had found him in contempt for failing to pay child support. R. 141 [138-39]. 
9
 Ms. Parks testified that Mr. Houghton sent Hillary $50 for her birthday one year, but 
Ms. Parks was unable to recall the year. R. 141 [64]. 
8 
job.10 However, Ms. Parks has been unable to provide Hillary with advantages such as 
voice lessons, art classes, and fitness center membership. R. 141 [62-63]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
As a whole, the jury instructions are confusing and misleading because three 
instructions are incorrect statements of the law, argumentative, duplicative, or 
inconsistent with other instructions. 
One instruction directly conflicts with the Criminal Nonsupport statute. That 
instruction indicates that partial payments of child support constitute the crime of 
Criminal Nonsupport "so long as the support furnished is not adequate under the 
circumstances." R. 83. However, the statute indicates that Criminal Nonsupport is 
committed when a parent fails to support a child and the child is either in "needy 
circumstances" or "would be in needy circumstances but for support received from a 
source other than the defendant or paid on the defendant's behalf." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
7-201(1) (a) and (b) (1999). Because the phrase "not adequate under the circumstances" 
is fundamentally different from the phrase "needy circumstances," the jury was misled 
regarding a basic element of the crime. On this basis alone, Mr. Houghton is entitled to a 
reversal of his conviction. See State v. Pearson, 1999 UT App 220, U 12, 985 P.2d 919 
0°[A]n accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is essential, [and so] 
10
 R. 141 [61]. Besides Ms. Parks, her husband, and Hillary, the Parks' household 
consists of Ms. Parks' daughter, Emery, from her first marriage, R. 141 [60], and another 
daughter, Annika, from Ms. Parks current marriage. Id. 
9 
the failure to provide such an instruction is reversible error that can never be considered 
harmless."') (citation omitted). 
Another instruction, which indicates that "[o]ne who fails to diligently seek 
employment or engages in activity causing the loss of employment does not have a 
lawful excuse to a failure to provide charge," R. 87, is also incorrect. There is nothing in 
statutory or case law to support that diligent, as opposed to reasonable, effort is required. 
In fact, the case law infers that reasonableness is the correct standard.11 Additionally, the 
instruction is confusing because a reasonableness instruction was given, R. 86, as well as 
an instruction that the simple failure to provide the support was the prohibited criminal 
act. R. 80, 82. These instructions are irreconcilable, and rendered the instructions 
misleading and confusing as a whole. 
The instruction which indicates that a parent "must make reasonable efforts to find 
ways to provide support for his or her children," R. 86, not only contributes to the 
confusion, it aids in the overemphasis of the parent's duty to provide support. The 
parent's duty to provide support is covered in no less than five separate jury instructions, 
R. 80, 82, 83, 86, and 87, and three of them do not refer to the element of whether a 
parent had just cause to do so. Further, the element of just cause is not covered in any 
11
 See State v. Barlow. 851 P.2d 1191, 1193-94 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (cert, denied 859 
P.2d 585 (Utah 1993) (examining whether defendant had the ability to generate income, earned 
wages during the period in which he failed to provide support, and failed to make child support 
payments); State v. Bess, 137 P. 829, 832 (Utah 1913) (examining whether the defendant 
willfully remained idle when he had the opportunity to work and whether he wasted his 
earnings). 
10 
separate instructions. As the Utah Supreme Court indicated, "[t]he overemphasis of a 
point may be as misleading to a jury as the omission of a point," State v. Clayton, 646 
P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1982), and such an error constitutes reversal. 
Finally, taken together, the three instructions are argumentative. The partial 
payments instruction is especially damaging because it focuses upon Mr. Houghton's 
effort to pay whatever he could, even when he did not have enough money to make the 
entire payment, and then characterizes this effort as a criminal act. Evidence of partial 
payments could just as easily have been construed as an indication that Mr. Houghton 
was doing his best, but the jury instruction did not allow for such an inference. This is 
poor public policy as well as argumentative because it discourages those living in poverty 
from paying whatever they can to support their child. 
The second issue in this case involves the prosecutor's failure to present sufficient 
evidence to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Houghton did not have just cause 
in failing to pay child support. The term "just cause" refers to a defendant's "inability to 
provide support," Barlow, 851 P.2d at 1193, and is shown by proving that the defendant 
lacked excuse or justification in failing to provide the support. Epp v. State. 814 P.2d 
1011,1013(1991). 
The evidence in this case indicates that Mr. Houghton lost his job and was able to 
find only temporary or part-time work until he was admitted to the White City 
Domiciliary for homelessness and health problems. R. 141 [107-116]. Thereafter, 
because of the tremors in his hands, he could find only basic labor jobs in exchange for 
11 
room and board. R. 141 [108-16]. The prosecutor failed to show that Mr. Houghton had 
the ability to make child support payments and did not do so. The prosecutor also did not 
show that Mr. Houghton's efforts to surmount his health and financial obstacles were in 
bad faith. Therefore, the statutory requirements of Criminal Nonsupport were not met, 
and Mr. Houghton's conviction should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ISSUING SUPERFLUOUS JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS WHICH INACCURATELY STATED THE LAW, 
COMMENTED UPON THE EVIDENCE, AND OVEREMPHASIZED ONE 
LEGAL ELEMENT 
Mr. Houghton's conviction should be reversed and this case should be remanded 
for a new trial because the court issued three jury instructions which rendered the entire 
charge confusing and misleading. Instructions five and six correctly described the 
elements of the third degree felony of Criminal Nonsupport, R. 80-81, and the lesser 
included offense of class A misdemeanor Criminal Nonsupport. R. 82. However, in the 
next instruction the court erroneously instructed the jury that Criminal Nonsupport is 
committed "not only where there is a complete failure to support the child, but also where 
there is a partial failure to provide for the children, so long as the support furnished is not 
adequate under the circumstances." R. 83, 141 [155]. 
There is no basis in statute or case law for this treatment of partial payments of 
child support. In fact, the instruction is contrary to the statute because the statute focuses 
12 
upon the "needy circumstances" of a child, rather than upon the adequacy of the child's 
circumstances. The instruction is effectively negative commentary upon Mr. Houghton's 
effort to support his daughter by sending partial payments even though he could not pay 
the entire amount. Such an instruction discourages those who are destitute from paying 
whatever they can afford. It is poor policy as well as unfair. 
Two other instructions magnified the error of the partial payments instruction by 
emphasizing that a parent must "diligently seek employment" R. 87 and "make 
reasonable efforts to find ways to provide support for his or her children." R. 86. These 
instructions were superfluous because the jury had already been twice instructed that the 
criminal act at issue was whether Mr. Houghton had "knowingly and without just cause 
failed to provide for the support of the child " R. 80, 82. Taken as a whole, the jury 
instructions overemphasized the parental duty to provide support at the expense of 
whether the parent had "just cause," R. 80, 82, in failing to do so. This was confusing and 
misleading, especially in light of the erroneous partial payment instruction. 
In reviewing jury instructions, this Court grants no deference to the trial court's 
ruling and examines the instructions for correctness. State v. Widdison. 2000 UT App 
185, K 52, 4 P.3d 100; State v. Pearson, 1999 UT App 220, If 7, 985 P.2d 919. The "[j]ury 
instructions must be read and evaluated as a whole."12 They "must accurately and 
adequately inform a criminal jury as to the basic elements of the crime charged." State v. 
12
 State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). See also State v. Bingham, 684 
P.2d 43,45 (Utah 1984) (quoting State v. Brooks. 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981)); State v. 
PascuaL 804 P.2d 553, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
13 
Larsen, 876 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). The language should be clear and 
definite, and "should be consistent and harmonious throughout the entire charge " 
Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 463 (13th ed. 1992). Further, "[a] 
defendant [] has the right to have his or her theory of the case presented to the jury in a 
clear and comprehensible manner." State v. Robertson. 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997). "In 
determining whether the jury was properly instructed so as to avoid confusion and fairly 
present the issues raised by both the State and Appellant, a reviewing court must consider 
all of the jury instructions read together in light of the total evidence before the jury." 
State v. Lawson. 688 P.2d 479,481 (Utah 1984). 
Significantly, jury instructions should not be argumentative. Charles E. Torcia, 
Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 463 (13th ed. 1992). Many courts have specified that 
argumentative instructions are those which call attention to specific evidence or invite the 
jury to draw inferences favorable to one of the two parties.13 In this State, the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure prohibit a court's commentary upon the evidence.14 The reasons for 
this prohibition are largely self-evident. Argumentative instructions issued by the trial 
judge distort the legal principals which guide the jury and irreparably damage the jury's 
13
 People v. Pore. 997 P.2d 1214,1221-22 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (cert denied Pore v. 
People. 2000 Colo. Lexis 633 (Colo. 2000)); People v. Earp, 978 P.2d 15, 54 (Cal. 1999) (U.S. 
cert denied 529 U.S. 1005 (2000)); Madrid v. State. 910 P.2d 1340, 1346 (Wyo. 1996); State v. 
Pavis, 874 P.2d 1156, 1163 (Kan. 1994); People v. Panielson. 838 P.2d 729, 743 (Cal. 1992); 
and State v. Reneau. 804 P.2d 408, 409 (N.M. App. 1990). 
14
 Utah R.Crim.Pro. 19(d) (2001) ("The Court shall not comment on the evidence in the 
case, and if the court refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the 
exclusive judges of all questions of fact.") 
14 
objectivity in making factual determinations in a case. Explanation and argument should 
be left to counsel in closing arguments, and not incorporated into the jury instructions.15 
Further, instructions which confuse and mislead the jury by duplicating each other 
or by overemphasizing a particular point are reversible error.16 In State v. Clayton the 
Utah Supreme Court rejected an argument that a duplicative instruction should have been 
given at trial, and held that "[t]he overemphasis of a point may be as misleading to a jury 
as the omission of a point." State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1982). The Utah 
Supreme Court and this Court have both indicated that a trial court's failure to instruct 
the jury on points of the law is reversible.17 The effects of overemphasizing and 
duplicating a point are equally disastrous, and are also grounds for reversal.18 
15
 See Utah R.Crim. Pro. 19 (e) (2001) ("Arguments of the respective parties shall be 
made after the court has instructed the jury.") See also Reneau, 804 P.2d at 409 ("Argument and 
explanation are left to counsel.") 
16
 People v. Mandez. 997 P.2d 1254, 1270 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999); People v. Inman. 950 
P.2d 640, 645 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997); and People v. Mickev. 818 P.2d 84, 112-13 (Cal. 1991). 
See also Salt Lake Citv v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("'[T]he trial court 
does not err in refusing to give a requested instruction if the point is properly covered in other 
instructions presented to the jury.'" (citation omitted)); State v. Reedv. 681 P.2d 1251, 1252-53 
(Utah 1984) ("[I]t is not error to refuse an instruction if its content is set out in others.") 
17
 Reedy, 681 P.2d at 1252; State v. Stringham. 957 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
18
 See State v. Clayton. 646 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1982) ("The defendant also complains 
that the trial court erred in failing to give a separate 'reasonable alternative hypothesis' 
instruction, in spite of the clear coverage of this point in the instruction quoted above. There was 
no need to repeat the same instruction twice. The overemphasis of a point may be as misleading 
to a jury as the omission of a point."); Stringham. 957 P.2d at 608 ("[B]ecause '[t]he general rule 
is that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is essential,' failure to 
provide such an instruction is reversible error that can never be considered harmless." (quoting 
State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1320 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). 
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A. Two Jury Instructions are Legally Incorrect and are also Unjust in Light 
of the Evidence Presented in this Case 
Two of the instructions, the instruction regarding partial payments of child support 
and the instruction regarding the diligent search for employment, are incorrect statements 
of the law. 
The instruction regarding partial payments of child support, R. 83, directly 
conflicts with the language of the Criminal Nonsupport statute. The statute indicates that 
Criminal Nonsupport is committed when a parent "fails to provide for the support" of his 
child where the child "(a) is in needy circumstances; or (b) would be in needy 
circumstances but for support received from a source other than the defendant or paid on 
the defendant's behalf." Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1) (1999). In other words, before 
criminal liability may attach, the child must be in needy circumstances or be faced with 
needy circumstances if not supported by another. If partial payments are enough to 
alleviate a child's needy circumstances, criminal liability does not attach.19 
The partial payments instruction, however, indicates that partial payments 
19
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (l)(a) & (b) (1999). A defendant may nevertheless be 
civilly liable for the balance of child support payments owing. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-9 
(1996) (providing for the civil enforcement of a child support obligation which is due or owing). 
Although the amount of child support ordered by a divorce decree or subsequent modifications is 
used to measure damages in a civil lawsuit, see Department of Human Services v. Jacobv, 1999 
UT App 52, f 21, 975 P.2d 939 (indicating that an enforcement action for child support 
arrearages is a civil action and that damages are based upon the unpaid portions of ordered child 
support); Jensen v. Bowcut. 892 P.2d 1053,1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (cert, denied 899 P.2d 
1231 (Utah 1995)) (recognizing non-custodial father's civil liability for child support even after 
death of custodial mother, where child's grandmother became guardian), the focus of the 
Criminal Nonsupport statute is different. The Criminal Nonsupport statute focuses upon a child's 
needy circumstances, not the amount ordered by divorce decree or subsequent modifications. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (l)(a) & (b) (1999). 
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constitute Criminal Nonsupport if the payments are "not adequate under the 
circumstances." R. 83. Adequacy is a fluid concept which is completely dependant upon 
the context in which the concept is used.20 Here, the evidence indicated that Ms. Parks 
was unable to provide Hillary with advantages such as voice lessons, art classes, and 
fitness center membership. R. 141 [62-63]. This may be deemed "inadequate under the 
circumstances" if Hillary wanted such advantages, just as a child's lack of a polo pony 
may be deemed inadequate if she wishes to participate in an international polo 
tournament. 
The statute, however, does not take such a broad view of the subject. The statute 
focuses on the "needy circumstances"21 of a child and indicates that, if a defendant 
knowingly and without just cause22 fails to provide support in such circumstances, he is 
guilty of Criminal Nonsupport. The partial payments instruction broadened the meaning 
of the Criminal Nonsupport statute to include any failure to provide items or advantages 
viewed subjectively by the child or custodial parent as desirable or "adequate." R. 83. It 
is therefore incorrect as a matter of law. 
20
 The word "adequate" is defined in the tenth edition of Merriam Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary as "sufficient for a specific requirement" or "barely sufficient or satisfactory" or 
"lawfully and reasonably sufficient." Merriam-Webster, Inc., Merriam Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary 14 (10th ed. 1993). 
21
 The term "needy" is defined as "being in want" or "poverty stricken." Merriam-
Webster, Inc., Merriam-Webster's Collegiate dictionary 776 (10th ed. 1997). 
22
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1) (1999). The "without just cause" was deleted in a 1995 
amendment, but was included in the jury instructions in this case. R. 80, 82. For further detail, 
see Section II, fn. 38 of this brief. 
17 
Further, it is presumed that the instruction was harmful to Mr. Houghton. 
"'[B]ecause "'[t]he general rule is that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of 
an offense is essential,'" the failure to provide such an instruction is reversible error that 
can never be considered harmless.'"23 The partial payments instruction was an inaccurate 
description of the element of the child's needy circumstances, and cannot be considered 
harmless. 
The jury instruction requiring a defendant to provide for his child by "diligently 
seek[ing] employment" is also incorrect. R. 87k There is nothing to support this 
instruction as opposed to its companion instruction which requires a "reasonable" effort 
to provide support. R. 86. Further, the case law supports the reasonableness instruction. 
Under the predecessor to this statute, a parent could be convicted for failing to support 
his children if "without just excuse [he] willfully neglected and refused to provide for 
their support and maintenance . . . . " State v. Bess. 137 P. 829, 832 (Utah 1913). In other 
words, if a defendant did not "willfully or otherwise remain idle when he could have 
obtained employment," or "spen[d] or waste[] any part of the money earned by him in 
dissipation or riotous living," he was not guilty under the statute. WL Reasonableness in 
light of a defendant's earning capacity and willingness to work were the essential issues, 
23
 Pearson, 1999 UT App 220, f 12 (citation omitted). See also Stringham. 957 P.2d at 
608 (reversing conviction where the jury instructions essentially mirrored the statutory language 
and then defined two different mens rea states). 
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Id., and this has not changed. 
Thus, the jury instruction specifying reasonableness, although superfluous because 
the issue was already covered in the general elements instructions,25 is correct. The 
instruction indicating that a parent commits Criminal Nonsupport by failing to "diligently 
seek employment" is wrong, and its inclusion was reversible error. 
As with the partial payments instruction, harmfulness is presumed. The diligent 
search for employment instruction is an incorrect statement of the "knowing" and 
"without just cause" elements of the crime. Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1) (1999). 
Because accurate instruction upon these elements is essential, the "'failure to provide 
such an instruction is reversible error that can never be considered harmless.'" Pearson. 
1999UTApp220,f7. 
B. Two Instructions Commented upon the Evidence in Violation of Rule 
19(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Besides being legally incorrect, the instruction regarding partial payment of child 
support and the instruction requiring diligent search for employment serve no purpose 
24
 See State v. Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191,1193-94 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Applying standard 
used in Nevada in which "[t]he State 'can establish willfulness by showing that a defendant 
neglects or refuses to provide support or maintenance for his or her children the State could 
establish willfulness by showing that a defendant '(1) had the ability to generate income; (2) 
earned wages during the time period in question; and (3) failed to make the child support 
payments/" (quoting Epp v. State, 814P.2d 1011, 1013 (1991)). 
25
 See Section I, Subsection C: "Because the Same Criminal Element was Covered by 
Five Separate Jury Instructions, the Element was Overemphasized and the Jury's Objective 
Evaluation of the Evidence was Damaged" (examining the affects of the superfluous jury 
instructions). 
19 
other than that of argumentation. Argumentation is prohibited by Rule 19(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure as well as persuasive case law.26 
The instruction regarding partial payments of child support is argumentative 
because it invited the jury to draw inferences in favor of the prosecution.27 First, it 
focused attention upon Mr. Houghton's efforts to pay something towards Hillary's 
support even when he couldn't make the full payment. Then, it cast these efforts in a 
negative light by suggesting inadequacy. Evidence that Mr. Houghton made partial 
payments could just as easily have been construed as a positive indication that he was 
doing his best to provide support, but this inference is not permitted under this 
instruction. 
The instruction effectively endowed the prosecution's case with judicial approval. 
The instruction's inference that Mr. Houghton's partial payments were not enough to 
protect him from criminal liability was articulated by the prosecutor during closing 
arguments.28 The instruction lent official support to the prosecutor's position. Moreover, 
the instruction was not suggested by the prosecutor, R. 56-61, or defense counsel, R. 65-
26
 Pore. 997 P.2d at 1221-22; Eare, 978 P.2d at 54; Madrid. 910 P.2d at 1346; Davis. 874 
P.2d at 1163; Danielson. 838 P.2d at 743; and Reneau, 804 P.2d at 409. 
27
 The instruction charged the jury to find Mr. Houghton guilty if he made partial 
payments which were "not adequate under the circumstances." R. 83. 
28
 The prosecutor pointed out that Mr. Houghton's resume indicated he had been a medic 
and had attended some college, and that he did not do the best that he could do to obtain a paying 
job. R. 141 [169-70]. The prosecutor argued that Mr. Houghton was happy working for room 
and board on ranches and in shops, and that he should have appealed the denial of disability 
benefits. R. 141 [171-72]. The prosecutor asserted "[t]his isn't doing the best you can." R. 141 
[172]. 
20 
73, but was added by the trial court upon its own volition. As argued by the defense 
counsel, the court's sua sponte instruction was impermissible commentary upon the 
evidence29 and constitutes reversible error. 
The instruction requiring a diligent search for employment was also 
argumentative. It focused specifically upon the prosecutor's argument that Mr. Houghton 
did not do the best he could to obtain paid employment. In closing arguments the 
prosecutor asserted that Mr. Houghton was happy working for room and board, and his 
failure to obtain paid employment demonstrated that he was not doing his best. R. 141 
[170-72, 185]. By instructing the jury that diligent effort was required, the trial court 
effectively endorsed this argument.30 
The diligent search instruction also foreclosed the jury's acceptance of Mr. 
Houghton's argument that his shaking hands and health problems precluded him from 
doing the hands-on work for which he had trained. R. 141 [175-76]. The defense counsel 
pointed out that, because of Mr. Houghton's health issues, he became homeless for 
awhile and was hospitalized. R. 141 [178-79]. Afterwards, the only jobs he could find 
were those which he did in exchange for living in old trailers or storage rooms. Id These 
points, which arguably showed just cause for Mr. Houghton's failure to pay child 
See R. 141 [186-87] ("[I]n my view each of those [instructions objected to] amount not 
to statement of the law but rather a comment on the evidence.") 
30
 R. 141 [172]. As with the partial payments instruction, the diligent search for 
employment instruction was not suggested by the prosecutor, R. 56-61, or defense counsel, R. 
65-73, but was added by the trial court upon its own volition. 
21 
support, were precluded from objective consideration because of the trial court's 
incorrect and argumentative instruction that diligent searching for employment was 
required. R. 87. 
The partial payment and diligent search instructions were harmful in this case. The 
prosecutor was required to show that Mr. Houghton did not have just cause in failing to 
pay child support. R. 80-82. Mr. Houghton's effort to make "at least partial [support] 
payments," R. 141 [114], his health problems, and his inability to find work arguably 
showed just cause. However, the partial payment and diligent search instructions 
foreclosed these inferences by incorrectly31 requiring the jury to focus exclusively upon 
the adequacy of Hillary's circumstances, R. 83, and the diligence of Mr. Houghton's 
employment search. R. 87. Without these instructions, there is a reasonable likelihood 
that "there would have been a result more favorable" to Mr. Houghton.32 Thus, Mr. 
Houghton's conviction should be reversed and this case should be remanded for a new 
trial. 
31
 Section I, Subsection A of this brief details the incorrectness of the partial payments 
and diligent search instructions. 
32
 See Rowlev v. Graven Brothers & Company. Inc.. 491 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah 1971) 
("The mandate of our law is that we do not reverse for mere error or irregularity. We do so only 
if the complaining party has been deprived of a fair trial. The test to be applied is: Was there 
error or irregularity such that there is a reasonable likelihood to believe that in its absence there 
would have been a result more favorable to him?")(footnotes omitted). See also Moore v. Utah 
Idaho Cent. R. Co., 174 P. 873, 879 (Utah 1918). 
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C. Because the Same Criminal Element was Covered bv Five Separate Jury 
Instructions, the Element was Overemphasized and the Jury's 
Objective Evaluation of the Evidence was Damaged 
The element of failing to support a child was overemphasized because it was 
covered in five separate jury instructions that overshadowed the issue of whether Mr. 
Houghton had just cause in failing to pay support. R. 80, 82, 83, 86, and 87. Instructions 
five and six included correct descriptions of all of the elements of third degree felony 
Criminal Nonsupport, R. 80, and the lesser included offense of class A misdemeanor 
Criminal Nonsupport. R. 82. These instructions were adequate and accurate. However, 
the trial court chose to add another instruction addressing the specific circumstance, 
already contemplated by the general elements instructions,33 of Mr. Houghton's partial 
payment of child support. The court then added a fourth instruction indicating that "a 
parent must make reasonable efforts to find ways to provide support for his or her 
children." R. 86. Finally, a fifth instruction was given which indicated that a person who 
"fails to diligently seek employment or engages in activity causing the loss of 
employment does not have a lawful excuse to a failure to provide charge." R. 87. 
R. 83. In accordance with the statute, the general elements instructions indicate that the 
criminal act is the failure to provide for the support of the child when the child is in needy 
circumstances, or would be in needy circumstances if not otherwise supported. R. 80, 82. If 
partial payments alleviate a child's needy circumstances, there is no liability under the statute 
because the "needy circumstances" element is not met. See Section I, Subsection B (explaining 
more fully the incorrectness of the "partial payments" jury instruction). Therefore, the general 
elements instructions contemplate full or partial payments of child support, and a separate 
instruction is unnecessary. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201(1) (1999) (Criminal nonsupport is 
committed when a person fails to provide for his child and the child "(a) is in needy 
circumstances; or (b) would be in needy circumstances but for support received from a source 
other than the defendant or paid on the defendant's behalf.") 
23 
Conceivably, one or perhaps two duplicative instructions could be given without 
unduly prejudicing a defendant because, in their entirety, the jury instructions could still 
"'fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case.'" Widdison. 2000 UT App 
185, H 52 (quoting State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992)). In this case, 
however, five separate instructions were given regarding the failure to support a child. R. 
80, 82, 83, 86, and 87. This was overemphasized at the expense of whether Mr. 
Houghton had just cause for doing so, and was "as misleading to [the] jury as the 
omission of a point." Clayton. 646 P.2d at 725. 
The overemphasis of the element of failing to provide support rendered the jury 
instructions inaccurate as a whole. '"[BJecause [t]he general rule is that an accurate 
instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is essential, the failure to provide such 
an instruction is reversible error that can never be considered harmless."9 Pearson, 1999 
UT App 220, f 12. However, even if a showing of prejudice was required, the error 
justifies a reversal. As indicated in the previous subsection, the evidence reasonably 
supports a finding that Mr. Houghton had just cause in failing to pay support. He paid 
whatever he could towards Hillary's support, experienced health problems, and was 
unable to find work. However, this evidence was submerged beneath the repetitive 
emphasis upon Mr. Houghton's duty to pay. Without this overemphasis, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury would have found just cause. Thus, Mr. Houghton's 
conviction should be reversed and this case should be remanded for a new trial. 
24 
D. The Jury was Erroneously Given Three Irreconcilable Instructions 
Regarding the Criminal Act of Failing to Support a Child 
As a whole, the jury instructions were confusing because of their peculiar 
inconsistencies. The jury was originally instructed that the prohibited act was, quite 
simply, a defendant's failure to support his child. R. 80, 82. This accorded with the 
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1) (1999), the plain language of which has remained 
largely unqualified by case law.34 A subsequent instruction employed the idea of 
reasonableness and indicated that "a parent must make reasonable efforts to find ways to 
provide support for his or her children." R. 86. This instruction was then muddled by 
another instruction which indicated that parents are required to "diligently seek 
employment," to provide for their children. R. 87. 
Whether the criminal act was any unmitigated failure to pay child support, or the 
failure to make reasonable efforts to provide for a child, or the failure to make diligent 
efforts to provide for a child, is, at best, unclear in the instructions. The confusion is 
heightened considering that a lay jury cannot be expected to know all of the implications 
of terms of art such as "just cause" and "reasonableness." As a whole, the charge is not 
consistent or harmonious,35 and is misleading and confusing. This renders the jury verdict 
See Id. Notes to Decisions (noting only six cases relevant to the statute in the last 
century). 
35
 See Charles E. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Procedure § 463 (13th ed. 1992) (The trial 
judge's instructions, whether on his own motion or upon the request of a party . . . should be 
consistent and harmonious throughout the entire charge ....") 
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unreliable and reversible as a matter of law. 
II. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
SHOW THAT MR. HOUGHTON DID NOT HAVE JUST CAUSE IN 
FAILING TO PAY FOR THE SUPPORT OF HIS DAUGHTER 
The evidence does not support Mr. Houghton's conviction because it does not 
show that Mr. Houghton's physical disabilities or his financial condition did not 
constitute just cause for his failure to pay child support. Under section 76-7-201(1), as 
explained in the jury instructions, R. 80-82, Mr. Houghton's conviction cannot be upheld 
if the evidence does not show beyond a reasonable doubt37 that he "knowingly and 
without just cause failed to provide for the support" of Hillary.38 
36
 State v. Pearson, 1999 UT App 220,1f 12, 985 P.2d 919 ("'[B]ecause [t]he general rule 
is that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is essential, the failure to 
provide such an instruction is reversible error that can never be considered harmless.'") 
37
 R. 94. See State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229,231 (Utah 1980) (The evidence must be 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict "beyond a reasonable doubt.") 
38
 R. 80, 82. The jury instructions are in accordance with the statute as it read before May 
1,1995. The current version of the statute lacks the "without just cause" language. Utah Code 
Ann. §76-7-201(1) (1999). 
The "without just cause" language was correctly included in the jury instructions. The 
period of time covered by the charge included three years prior to the change of the statute. R. 3-
5. Because this Court applies "the law as it existed at the time of the crime charged," State v. 
Redd, 1999 UT 108, f 4 n.2, 992 P.2d 986, the "without just cause" language was necessary 
here. 
Additionally, the statute, as it currently reads, violates federal and state constitutional 
protections of due process and equal protection. It has long been held that, while poverty does 
not immunize a defendant from criminal liability, poverty also cannot be the basis for criminal 
liability. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 637-40 (1988); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-
73 (1983); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). In the context of fines and restitution, the 
United States Supreme Court held that: 
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The evidence indicates that Mr. Houghton had just cause. He has spent the past 
seven years living in old trailers and storage rooms on employers' properties, and he has 
not earned anything more than board and room for himself. R. 141 [120-25]. His inability 
to gain paid employment is due to his poor health. R. 141 [124-25]. Dating back to his 
teenage years, he experienced tremors in his hands and this condition worsened over 
time. R. 141 [74-75,115-16]. Other problems such as injuries and a hernia contributed to 
his problems. R. 141 [115]. In spite of his efforts he has been unable to obtain full-time, 
permanent employment since he lost his job at Snappy Welding Service in the mid-
1980s. R. 141 [70, 107-16]. Mr. Houghton testified that when he applied for work, 
if the probationer has made all reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and 
yet cannot do so through no fault of his own, it is fundamentally unfair to revoke 
probation automatically without considering whether adequate alternative 
methods of punishing the defendant are available. 
Bearden. 461 U.S. at 668-69. An inquiry into whether a defendant had justifiable reasons for his 
failure to pay is essential because, otherwise, his imprisonment "would be little more than 
punishing a person for his poverty." Id at 671. This principle was acknowledged by this Court in 
State v.Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 276-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The United States Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue of a defendant's failure 
to pay child support in Hicks v. Feiock. In that case, the Court held that a statute which requires 
a criminal defendant to show his inability to make child support payments violates due process 
because it undercuts the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Hicks, 485 
U.S. at 637. 
The current Criminal Nonsupport statute imposes criminal liability upon a defendant 
solely for his knowing failure to pay support, if the child is in needy circumstances or would be 
if not for the support of another. Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201(1) (1999). This mandates no 
evaluation of a defendant's ability to pay or effort to pay. The statute lumps parents who have 
made honest efforts to support their children with others who have willfully refused to pay child 
support, and labels all of them criminals. Without a mandated inquiry into a defendant's ability 
or effort to pay, the Criminal Nonsupport statute violates federal and state constitutional 
guarantees of due process and equal protection. 
27 
"[w]hoever I was supposed to go to work for would see me shaking and wouldn't want 
anything to do with me." R. 141 [125]. In these circumstances, a reasonable jury must 
have had reasonable doubt about the absence of just cause.39 
Revelent case law supports this. This Court held in State v. Barlow that the term 
"just cause" refers to a defendant's "inability to provide support." State v. Barlow. 851 
P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Recently, the Kansas Court of Appeals explored 
the term in more detail, indicating that "just cause" means: 
any cause of sufficient import to relieve the defendant, who under the law is 
charged with the duty of providing for the support and maintenance of his 
child, from such duty and legal obligation, such as mental incapacity or 
physical disability of the defendant, rendering him unable to provide for the 
support and maintenance of such child; or financial conditions which the 
defendant has honestly, in good faith, endeavored to overcome. 
State v. Filor. 13 P.3d 926, 928 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000). The Kansas court also explained 
that the term "just cause" was similar to the Kansas statutory term of "without lawful 
excuse."40 In defining "without lawful excuse," the Alaska Court of Appeals indicated 
that the State was required to show that "the accused either actually had funds available 
for payment of support or that he could have obtained such funds through reasonable 
efforts." Tavlorv. State, 710 P.2d 1019,1021 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). The Nevada 
Supreme Court, which was favorably quoted by this Court in Barlow, indicated that 
39
 See State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443,444 (Utah 1983) ("We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.") 
40
 Id This Court made the same observation in Barlow. 851 P.2d at 1193. 
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"without lawful excuse" implies "lack of just cause, excuse or justification." Epp v. State. 
814 P.2d 1011, 1013 (1991) (citation omitted). 
Here, the State has not shown that Mr. Houghton did not have just cause in failing 
to provide for the support of Hillary. The evidence, fully marshaled and regarded in the 
light most favorable to the State,41 is as follows: 
* When Mr. Houghton was married to Ms. Parks in the mid-1980s, he was 
steadily employed as a welder. R. 141 [70]. 
* At that time, Mr. Houghton wrote a resume which indicated that he had attended 
one year of college in 1966-67 before working as a medic in the army. It also indicated 
that he had studied respiratory therapy in the early 1970s before graduating with a 
welding degree. Between 1975 and the late 1980s, he worked at welding, fabricating, and 
similar -type jobs. Exhibit Envelope [Resume]. 
* Ms. Parks testified that, although Mr. Houghton had always had trouble with 
shaking hands, it had never, to her knowledge, affected his employability. R. 141 [82]. 
* In 1993 Ms. Parks had a telephone conversation with Mr. Houghton in which he 
indicated that, if Ms. Parks put him in jail for failing to pay child support, she would not 
receive another penny. R. 141 [69]. 
* In 1993-94 Mr. Houghton stayed at the White City Domiciliary and received 
medical attention for most of his health problems. R. 141 [117, 130]. He did not receive 
41
 See Petree, 659 P.2d at 444 ("[W]e review the evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury.") 
29 
successful treatment for his hand tremors, however. R. 141 [118-19]. 
* Mr. Houghton did not appeal the denial of disability benefits which he had 
applied for by court order. R. 141 [126,139]. 
* Mr. Houghton "was humiliated" by the way people would look at him when he 
applied for work, and he "got tired of applying." R. 141 [150]. He has never applied for 
work at a fast food establishment. Id. 
This evidence does not establish that Mr. Houghton did not have just cause in 
failing to pay child support. It does not indicate that he had the financial means to pay,42 
that he lacked excuse or justification in failing to pay,43 or that he did not make a bona 
fide effort to overcome his health and financial obstacles in order to provide support.44 
The evidence does not show that Mr. Houghton ever turned down offered work, failed to 
try to get help for the health troubles that limited his ability to work, or failed to pay child 
support when he had money. 
Specifically, evidence that Mr. Houghton had experience as an army medic and 
studied respiratory therapy would not likely benefit him in the job market twenty-five or 
thirty years later. Since the early 1970s, Mr. Houghton's education and experience has 
42
 See Barlow. 851 P.2d at 1193 (holding that "just cause" refers to a defendant's 
"inability to provide support"). 
43
 See Epp. 814 P.2d at 1013 (indicating that "without lawful excuse," which is similar to 
"just cause" indicates a "lack of just cause, excuse or justification.") 
44
 See Filor. 13 P.3d at 928 (holding that "just cause" implies someone who has honestly, 
and in good faith, endeavored to overcome financial conditions which renders him unable to pay 
child support). 
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been in specialized manual labor fields such as welding, fabricating, and millwright 
work. The State did not show that Mr. Houghton's health troubles or lack of opportunity 
have not precluded him from obtaining such work. 
The State attempted to minimize evidence of the negative effect of Mr. 
Houghton's hand tremors upon potential employers by pointing out that Mr. Houghton 
maintained steady employment in the mid-1980s in spite of the tremors. However, this 
does not indicate that he had the ability to obtain or maintain employment after the 
tremors had worsened. 
Although the prosecutor was able to elicit testimony that Mr. Houghton got "tired 
of applying'5 for jobs after experiencing feelings of humiliation, R. 141 [150], and also 
that he had never applied for work at a fast food establishment, this was not sufficient to 
meet the burden of proof. Testimony that Mr. Houghton became tired of applying for 
work after years of disappointment and health problems does not indicate that he did not 
make reasonable, or even diligent efforts to find work. Also, testimony that he did not 
apply for a job in one particular field of work, fast food labor, does not indicate that he 
did not make honest, reasonable efforts to obtain employment. It is not reasonable to 
require a person to run the gamut of available fields of work in search of employment. 
Such a requirement would be insurmountable to many people and impractical to most. 
Likewise, Mr. Houghton's decision to forego an appeal of the denial of disability 
benefits does not indicate that his efforts to provide support for Hillary were not in good 
faith. Without more evidence concerning the denial or possible bases for appeal, there is 
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nothing to indicate that an appeal may have been successful. There is also nothing to 
indicate whether such benefits would have been sufficient to pay the child support. 
The prosecutor had the burden of proving that Mr. Houghton's efforts to 
overcome his health and financial obstacles were not in good faith or reasonably 
sufficient,45 and the prosecutor failed to meet this burden. In fact, the evidence supports 
that Mr. Houghton experienced job loss, health problems, lack of opportunity, poverty, 
and homelessness. This indicates an inability to pay,46 and constitutes just cause in failing 
to pay. Therefore, Mr. Houghton's conviction fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Houghton's conviction should be reversed on the basis of insufficient 
evidence. Alternatively, his conviction should be reversed and this case should be 
remanded for a new trial because three of the jury instructions were argumentative, 
duplicative, inconsistent with the other instructions, and incorrect statements of the law. 
45
 See Filor. 13 P.3d at 928 (indicating that a parent must make an honest, good faith 
effort to overcome his health or financial conditions to provide for his child); Barlow. 851 P.2d 
at 1193 (indicating that a parent's inability to support his child must be shown to be without 
excuse or justification); Taylor. 710 P.2d at 1021 (indicating that a parent must make reasonable 
efforts to obtain support money). 
46Bariow,851P.2datll93. 
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ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
STUART FOSTER HOUGHTON, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001905559 FS 
Judge: J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Date: December 15, 2000 
ENTERCD IN REGISTRY 
PRESENT 
C l e r k : c i n d y b 
P r o s e c u t o r : ANGELIDES, NICHOLAS J 
Defendan t 
D e f e n d a n t ' s A t t o r n e y ( s ) : REMAL, LISA J . 
DATE 
OF JUDG ,MENTS 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 4, 1948 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 10:25-10:33 
CHARGES 
1. CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/08/2000 {Guilty Plea} 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
P^oc* 1 . . —.. I/M i-rv\kl 
Case No: 001905559 
Date: Dec 15, 2000 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court grants credit for 202 days time served. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
Restitution: Amount: $23870.20 
Extradition: 
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE 
D^/r^i O fl ^e*t-\ V » -v 
ADDENDUM B 
76-7-201 UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
History: C. 1953, 76-7-104, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-7-104. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS since for a conviction under the first statute the 
state must prove the victim's age, and for a 
Construction with other statutes. conviction under this one that the participants 
Cited.
 Were unmarried. State ex rel. W.C.R v. State, 
^ * *• *u ±u * * ± 974 P.2d 302 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Construction with other statutes. vv 
There is no overlap between the rape of a Cited in Oliverson v. West Valley City, 875 P. 
child statute, § 76-5-402.1, and this statute, Supp. 1465 (D. Utah 1995). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Adultery and AXJL — Validity of statute making adultery 
Fornication § 6. and fornication criminal offenses, 41 A.L.R.3d 
C.J.S. — 37 C.J.S. Fornication § 2. 1338. 
PART 2 
NONSUPPORT AND SALE OF CHILDREN 
76-7-201. Criminal nonsupport. 
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse, a child, or 
children under the age of 18 years, he knowingly fails to provide for the support 
of the spouse, child, or children when any one of them: 
(a) is in needy circumstances; or 
(b) would be in needy circumstances but for support received from a 
source other than the defendant or paid on the defendant's behalf. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), criminal nonsupport is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree if the actor: 
(a) has been convicted one or more times of nonsupport, whether in this 
state, any other state, or any court of the United States; 
(b) committed the offense while residing outside of Utah; or 
(c) commits the crime of nonsupport in each of 18 individual months 
within any 24-month period, or the total arrearage is in excess of $10,000. 
(4) For purposes of this section "child" includes a child born out of wedlock 
whose paternity has been admitted by the actor or has been established in a 
civil suit. 
(5) (a) In a prosecution for criminal nonsupport under this section, it is an 
affirmative defense that the accused is unable to provide support. Volun-
tary unemployment or underemployment by the defendant does not give 
rise to that defense. 
(b) Not less than 20 days before trial the defendant shall file and serve 
on the prosecuting attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim 
the affirmative defense of inability to provide support. The notice shall 
specifically identify the factual basis for the defense and the names and 
addresses of the witnesses who the defendant proposes to examine in 
order to establish the defense. 
(c) Not more than ten days after receipt of the notice described in 
Subsection (5)(b), or at such other time as the court may direct, the 
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prosecuting attorney shall file and serve the defendant with a notice 
containing the names and addresses of the witnesses who the state 
proposes to examine in order to contradict or rebut the defendant's claim, 
(d) Failure to comply with the requirements of Subsection (5)(b) or (5)(c) 
entitles the opposing party to a continuance to allow for preparation. If the 
court finds that a party's failure to comply is the result of bad faith, it may 
impose appropriate sanctions. 
History: C. 1963, 76-7-201, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-7-201; 1974, ch. 32, § 21; 
1995, ch. 289, § 1; 1999, ch. 89, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, changed "sixteen" 
to u18" and deleted "and without just cause" 
after "knowingly" in Subsection (1); added "or 
any court of the United States" in Subsection 
(3Xa); added Subsection (6); and made stylistic 
changes. 
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, 
divided Subsection (1), adding the Subsection 
(lXa) designation; added Subsection (1Kb); sub-
stituted "outside of Utah" for "in another staten 
in Subsection (3)(b); added Subsection (3)(c); 
deleted former Subsection (5) which read "In a 
prosecution under this section, it is no defense 
that the person to be supported received neces-
sary support from a source other than the 
defendant," redesignating Subsection (6) as (5); 
and made related and stylistic changes 
throughout the section. 
Cross-References. — Power of juvenile 
court, § 78-3a-104 et seq. 
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, 
§ 78-45f-100 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Defenses. 
Duty of father. 
—In general. 
—Relief from duty to support. 
Just cause. 
Nonresident. 
Defenses. 
Under former Penal Code provision on deser-
tion of family it was no defense that destitute 
children were relieved by charitable acts of 
third persons. State v. Bess, 44 Utah 39, 137 P. 
829 (1913). 
Duty of father. 
—In general. 
It was duty of father to support his minor 
children if he was able to do so; and it was 
criminal offense willfully to fail to support one's 
minor children under age of sixteen years. 
Burbidge v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 55 Utah 
566, 196 P. 556 (1921); Rockwood v. Rockwood, 
65 Utah 261, 236 P. 457 (1925). 
—Relief from duty to support. 
Court had no right to make final order per-
manently relieving father of his obligation to 
support his child, except under the Adoption 
Statute. Riding v. Riding, 8 Utah 2d 136, 329 
P.2d 878 (1958). 
Just cause. 
Under former § 76-15-1, it must have been 
shown beyond reasonable doubt that children 
were in destitute and necessitous circum-
stances, and father must have willfully ne-
glected and refused, without just cause, to 
provide for children; if it appeared that current 
and necessary expenses for himself and chil-
dren exceeded his earnings, that he had not 
remained idle when he could have obtained 
employment, and had not wasted any part of 
his earnings, he should have been acquitted. 
State v. Bess, 44 Utah 39, 137 P. 829 (1913). 
Defendant who worked, during the charged 
period, in an apparently operable and operat-
ing auto-repair shop licensed under his new 
wife's name failed to prove just cause for his 
nonsupport and was therefore criminally liable. 
State v. Barlow, 851 P.2d 1191 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
Nonresident. 
Husband who was resident of another state 
could be charged with offense of failure to 
provide in state in which he had permitted his 
wife or children to live, or in which his miscon-
duct had induced them to seek refuge. Osborn v. 
Harris, 115 Utah 204, 203 P.2d 917 (1949). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. -
Wife § 329. 
- 41 Am. Jur. 2d Husband and A.LJt — Homicide by withholding food, 
clothing, or shelter, 61 A.L.R.3d 1207. 
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ADDENDUM C 
Rule 19 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 426 
Right of defense m criminal prosecution to dant's guilt, 50 A.L.R.4th 969. 
disclosure of prosecution information regarding Professional or business relations between 
prospective jurors, 86 A.L.R.3d 571. proposed juror and attorney as ground for chal-
Racial or ethnic prejudice of prospective ju- ienge for cause, 52 A.L.R.4th 964 
ran as proper subject of inquiry or ground of
 F a c t that juror in criminal case, or juror's 
AL S i s 1 V°ir m °n ^ 94 relatlVe °r f h e n d ' haS Previouslv b e e n victlm * 
w i V i r rci x i „ criminal incident as ground of disqualification, Religious belief, affiliation, or prejudice of 65 A L R 4fch 743 
prospective juror as proper subject of inquiry or r » ' \ ^ V ^ x ^ i_ *. 
ground for challenge on voir dire, 95 A.L R 3d P roP™Jy ° f substituting juror in bifurcated 
yj2 state trial after end of first phase and before 
Excusing, on account of public, charitable, or s e c o n d p h a s e 1S ^ v e n to j u r y > 8 9 A L R 4 t h 423. 
educational employment, one qualified and not Exclusion of public and media from voir dire 
specifically exempted as juror in state criminal examination of prospective jurors in state cnm-
case as ground of complaint by accused, 99 m a * case, 16 A.L.R.5th 152. 
A.L.R.3d 1261. Use of peremptory challenges to exclude eth-
Additional peremptory challenges because of n i c an(* racial groups, other than black Amen-
multiple criminal charges, 5 A.L.R.4th 533 cans, from criminal jury — post-Batson state 
Validity and construction of statute or court cases, 20 A.L.R.5th 398. 
rule prescribing number of peremptory chal- Use of peremptory challenges to exclude Cau-
lenges in criminal cases according to nature of casian persons, as a racial group, from criminal 
offense or extent of punishment, 8 A.L.R 4th jury — post-Batson state cases, 47 A.L.R.5th 
149. 259 
Cure of prejudice resulting from statement Examination and challenge of federal case 
by prospective juror during voir dire, m pres- jurors on basis of attitudes toward homosexu-
ence of other prospective jurors, as to defen- ahty, 85 A.L.R. Fed. 864 
Rule 19. Instructions. 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court 
reasonably directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct 
the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such 
requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel 
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy 
of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions 
may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request s0 presented and given, or refused, the court 
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part 
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of 
the charge was given and what part was refused. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. 
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instruc-
tions in order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court^  
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the 
exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court ha* 
instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon! 
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Effect of submitting __ Elements of offense 
Elements of offense. -Lesser included offenses 
Failure to request or object.
 rT , . , x ,. . J i C l 
-Review without objection. -Unreliability of eyewitness identification. 
Objections. —Verdict-urging instruction 
—Failure to object Untimely request. 
—Specificity Cited. 
—Tune 
Presumptions Effect of submitting. 
Requests by jury When an instruction is submitted by a part 
Specific instructions that same party cannot later object to it, he hi 
—Circumstantial evidence already waived any objection and endorsed it i 
